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Consciousness as Inference in Time
A Commentary on Victor Lamme
Lucia Melloni
Unraveling the neural correlates of conscious remains one of the great challenges
of our time. Victor Lamme proposes that neural integration through feedback loops
is what differentiates conscious from unconscious processing. Here, I review his
hypothesis, focusing on the spatial scale of integration as well as the possible
neural mechanisms involved. I go on to show that any theory of the neural correl-
ates of consciousness is incomplete if it cannot account for how prior knowledge
shapes perception and how this form of integration occurs. Finally, I propose that
integration across moments in time is a crucial but hitherto neglected aspect of
conscious perception, which creates the “flow” of conscious experience. 
Keywords
Active sensing | Expectations | Flow of consciousness | Neural correlates of con-
sciousness | Predictive coding
Commentator
Lucia Melloni
lucia.melloni@brain.mpg.de   
Max Planck Institute for Brain 
Research
Frankfurt a. M., Germany
Target Author
Victor Lamme
victorlamme@gmail.com   
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 
Editors
Thomas Metzinger
metzinger@uni-mainz.de   
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität
Mainz, Germany
Jennifer M. Windt
jennifer.windt@monash.edu   
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
1 Qualia 2.1: Integration is key but is it 
all?
Why do we see the way we see? How is our per-
ception different from the way a photograph is ac-
quired on the sensor chip of a digital camera? It
seems obvious that we do not see an image made
of  individual  pixels  but  an integrated,  smooth,
colourful,  and vivid image. What is the neural
substrate of this marvellous capacity that makes
us feel and experience the way we do? These are
the central questions that Victor Lamme sets out
to address in his paper The Crack of Dawn: Per-
ceptual  Functions and Neural  Mechanisms that
Mark the Transition from Unconscious Processing
to Conscious Vision.
This  is  by no means an easy task,  even
when one stays away from the difficult problem
of qualia or “what it is like to be” (Nagel 1974).
The question of how awareness arises has preoc-
cupied philosophers and scientists for centuries,
and while significant progress has been made in
recent decades we are still far from reaching a
conclusion  (Dehaene 2014;  Koch 2004).  One
thing is clear however: success in understanding
the  neural  machinery  that  instantiates  con-
sciousness rests on identifying the fundamental
features that characterise a state as conscious
and that distinguish it from unconscious states.
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A remarkable discovery of the past century is
that a significant portion of all mental opera-
tions, including fairly complex ones such as de-
cision-making  and  perceptual  categorisation,
can be carried out unconsciously. Take the case
of language: while it seems effortless to under-
stand the words that you are currently reading,
you do not  have conscious access  to the syn-
tactic  processes  that  ultimately  allow  you  to
grasp the relations between the elements of this
sentence and thus its meaning. These complex
mental operations occur “behind the scene” of
consciousness. Given that so many intricate pro-
cesses  can  operate  unconsciously,  one  cannot
but  wonder  what  consciousness  is  good  for.
Which mental processes require consciousness, if
any? And if so, what really distinguishes con-
scious  from  unconscious  cognition?  Victor
Lamme offers a stimulating and comprehensive
review of processes in vision that can be per-
formed outside the realm of awareness. The list
is long and may be surprising (also see Kouider
&  Dehaene 2007),  ranging  from  detection  of
simple  (e.g.,  oriented  lines)  and  complex  fea-
tures (e.g., faces;  Almeida et al. 2013;  de Gar-
delle et  al. 2011;  Del Zotto et  al. 2013),  to
mathematical operations such as abstract com-
parisons  between  quantities  (Greenwald et  al.
2003), to triggering of motor plans (Dehaene et
al. 1998),  and even error-related  responses  to
stimuli that fully escape our consciousness (Co-
hen et al. 2009). 
What do we need consciousness for, then?
Lamme proposes that consciousness is required
when all sources of information need to be in-
tegrated. For instance, when we see a face, we
can not only detect that is a face, a process that
can  be  performed  unconsciously,  but  also
identify it as that of our friend Billy, whom we
have not seen in ten years and that we remem-
ber warmheartedly  from  our  childhood.  Con-
sciousness brings this  unified moment in which
all comes together: previous experiences are re-
trieved from memory (e.g., do we have reason to
like Billy?) and unified with the context of the
current  experience  (e.g.,  where  are  we now?),
but also intertwined with predictions for future
actions (e.g., would we like to engage in a con-
versation?). Thus, in one single moment, past,
present and future come together and form a
unified  conscious  experience.  Many  scientists
nowadays  agree  that  conscious  experience
provides an abstract  summary of  all  available
sources  of  information,  from which many fea-
tures  are  filtered  out  and  reinterpreted  in  a
format that is most useful for further actions,
thoughts,  deliberations,  and  chain  operations
that cannot be processed by non-conscious pro-
cessors (Lamme this collection; Baars 2002; De-
haene 2014;  Melloni &  Singer 2010).  Hence,
what  reaches  our  perception  is  a  highly  pro-
cessed, “interpreted” version of the world. One
key intuition is that the unification and “inter-
pretation”  of  the  experience  that  reaches  our
consciousness is achieved through the activation
of myriads of neurons that signal individual fea-
tures, but that it is by virtue of integrating their
information  through dynamic  interactions  (for
example via synchronous coordination of their
activity or via feedback processes) that a coher-
ent  experience  across  senses,  space,  and  time
comes about. 
An important caveat is that integration of
information per se is unlikely to distinguish con-
scious from unconscious processing as integra-
tion of many features can also proceed uncon-
sciously  (Dehaene et  al. 1998;  Gaillard et  al.
2009; Lin & He 2009; Melloni et al. 2007; Mel-
loni & Rodriguez 2007; Mudrik et al. 2014). In
fact,  integration through convergence is  a key
principle of the wiring of the brain, which ex-
plains  the  mere  existence  of  feature-selective
neurons that respond to motion, shape, or com-
plex stimuli such as faces, and that process in-
formation in an unconscious manner. If it is not
integration per se, then what kind of integration
are we talking about?1 We and others (Melloni
&  Singer 2010;  Thompson &  Varela 2001;
1 Giulio Tononi (2004; Tononi & Koch 2008) argues that not only in-
tegration but also differentiation/segregation (e.g., distinguishing a
particular state  from all  possible  other  states) is  characteristic  of
conscious states. However, even when both conditions are met, say
integration through convergence is observed in FFA and differenti-
ated from other states, e.g., there is no activation in PPA, an area
selective to processing places, and thus there is no guarantee that
this would constitute a conscious state. In fact, experimental evid-
ence suggests that such feature-selective processing can indeed pro-
ceed unconsciously, for example in the case of face processing under
conditions of masking (de Gardelle et al. 2011), continuous flash sup-
pression (Almeida et al. 2013), and in blindsight patients (Del Zotto
et al. 2013). 
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Varela et al. 2001) have previously argued for a
distinction between local and global integration,
and proposed that the spatial scale of integra-
tion differentiates between unconscious and con-
scious states: unconscious processing is observed
when local integration occurs within the diver-
gent-convergent  feedforward  architecture;  con-
scious  processing  however  requires  long-range
integration  through  neural  synchronization,
which integrates information across the various
levels of the cortical processing hierarchy. 
Indeed, in recent years, a wealth of experi-
mental studies (Aru et al. 2012;  Gaillard et al.
2009; Hipp et al. 2011; Melloni et al. 2007; Mel-
loni &  Rodriguez 2007) have provided support
to the idea that long-range integration through
synchronous coupling is a mechanism for con-
scious perception, and that the spatial scale of
synchronisation strongly correlates with the per-
ceptual outcome. For example, we have shown
that  masked  words  are  only  consciously  per-
ceived when accompanied by a burst of  long-
distance  synchronization  in  the  gamma band,
while unconscious processing, even up to a se-
mantic  level,  elicits  only  local  gamma oscilla-
tions (Melloni et al. 2007; Melloni & Rodriguez
2007). Although controversy still persists as to
whether long-range integration necessitates the
involvement of particular brain areas (Dehaene
2014; Edelman & Tononi 2000) or not (Lamme
this collection; Melloni & Singer 2010), it is re-
assuring  to  witness  some  convergence  on  the
results  that  have  even led to clinical  applica-
tions  (e.g.,  coma  classification,  King et  al.
2013). In his most recent work, Victor Lamme
now also assigns  a central  role  to  the spatial
scale of the integration for consciousness, join-
ing  an  ever-increasing  number  of  researchers
proposing long-range integration as key to con-
sciousness  (Dehaene &  Changeux 2011;  Edel-
man &  Tononi 2000;  Melloni &  Singer 2010;
Thompson & Varela 2001). An interesting point
of divergence from other theories is that while
Lamme assigns a particular role to feedback and
horizontal connections in the integration of in-
formation for consciousness, other theories, in-
cluding our own, hypothesise that it is the syn-
chronisation of neural populations that glues all
experiences into one, thereby instantiating con-
sciousness.  As  empirical  data  and  theoretical
considerations  continue  to  accumulate,  we ex-
pect  that  this  and  other  pressing  challenges
such  as  identifying  how  far  is  “long”  in  the
brain, or whether “long” involves the activation
of specific neural cell populations, specific areas,
and/or a specified number of nodes will become
addressable.
However,  imagine  those  questions  have
been addressed and we know that  integration
on a particular spatial scale is key to conscious-
ness; would we have understood what conscious-
ness is or how it comes about? Here I propose
that we would not, as any theory that does not
account for two fundamental, hitherto neglected
aspects of conscious experience will fall short of
explaining consciousness. In particular, our ex-
perience is never an island in isolation, but in-
stead is shaped by previous knowledge, by pri-
ors  that  stem  from  the  preceding  context  or
from our history of learning. These priors de-
termine our perception; and thus understanding
how they  become  integrated  is  paramount  to
explaining  consciousness.  However,  an  even
more pressing problem is that conscious experi-
ence unfolds over time, whereby the recent past
moulds the current moment, which in turn cre-
ates predictions for moments to come, i.e., the
future. How all those temporal processes inter-
twine  and  define  our  experience  (the  flow  of
consciousness) is something that most research
has neglected. In the following sections I will re-
view current research that we and others have
undertaken with the purpose of raising aware-
ness of these overlooked integrative properties of
conscious  experience  and  the  challenges  that
they entail for the study of consciousness.
2 Consciousness as an inferential 
process and the consequences for the 
neural mechanism of conscious 
perception
One central  and characteristic  feature of  con-
scious perception is its constructive nature. In
contrast to unconscious cognition, which is dir-
ectly driven by sensory stimulation, the images
that  reach  consciousness  often  bear  little  re-
semblance  to  reality.  Indeed,  percepts  in  our
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mind can be understood as useful distortions of
reality in which only specific parts of the phys-
ical input are represented while being enriched
with a model of the world that has been learned
and that provides context to the current mo-
ment.  In  the  words  of  Heinz von  Foerster
(1984), “the world, as we perceive it, is our own
invention”.  To  provide  a  striking  example  of
this, consider the image on the right (Figure 1)
and  try  to  figure  out  what  it  shows.  Most
people  at  first  see  a  collection  of  black  and
white blobs, much like the input that strikes our
retina—a raw, uninterpreted signal. Now, rotate
the page upside down. Voila!  You will  clearly
see a face (do you recognize whose face it is?).
Remarkably, you can turn the page back and
you will continue seeing the face. Once you have
recognized the image, the visual system has cre-
ated a  prior, an expectation that enriches per-
ception.  This  example  is  not  mere  curiosity.
Most  of  our  behaviour  and  perceptions  are
based on predictions: we do not wait for visual
input to impinge our eyes, we actively look for
it.  We  cannot,  however,  initiate  a  rational
search for an object without making predictions
about “what” it is, “where” it is likely to be,
and even “when” it is likely to be there. The
brain’s ability to make predictions and to mould
its data gathering accordingly is thus essential
for its ability to evaluate options, make life-crit-
ical decisions, and generate adaptive behaviour.
While  the constructive nature of  percep-
tion is undeniable and may even appear as one
of  its  defining  features,  surprisingly  little  re-
search has been carried out to understand how
previous  experience  interacts  with  conscious-
ness.  Most  importantly,  the  scientific  com-
munity has not embraced an understanding of
consciousness in the context of a flow of experi-
ence in which every moment is integrated with
past moments and interfaced with expectations
about what will happen in the future (but see
Varela 1999). A possible reason for neglecting
the contribution of previous experience is that
this integration of past with present moments
has  been  understood as  a  process  of  “uncon-
scious  inference”  (following  von Helmholtz
1866/1962), or, in Victor Lamme’s words, in the
context of  the “automaticity of  the many ex-
pectation effects.” However, this inferential pro-
cess is carried out in the backstage of conscious-
ness,  and  it  is  only  the  result  that  we  con-
sciously experience. This bears resemblance to
syntactic  analysis,  which  is  also  carried  out
automatically  and  unconsciously,  but  is  para-
mount to conscious access to meaning. Without
unconscious syntactic analysis we would not be
able to “consciously” understand text; nor is its
automatic activation under our control. In the
same vein, our conscious perception would be
totally different if prior knowledge did not help
us enrich or even construct our experience, en-
dowing it  with  meaning.  In fact,  it  has  been
proposed that alterations in perception, i.e., the
defragmented  sensory  experience  observed  in
schizophrenics  and autistic  people  can  be the
result  of  a  deficit  in  this  inferential  process
(Jardri & Deneve 2013; Pellicano & Burr 2012),
underscoring the fundamental role that percep-
tual inference plays in conscious perception.
One  promising  framework  within  which
the influence of previous experience through un-
conscious  inference  can  be  understood  is  the
Bayesian framework. When applied to percep-
tion, each mathematically-formulated ingredient
of this framework can be assigned a perceptual
counterpart, with previous experience referring
to the prior,  the current moment referring to
the likelihood, unconscious inference referring to
Bayes rule (which combines the prior with the
likelihood in an optimal way), and the result—
our perception—referring to (the peak of) the
posterior  distribution.  This  idea  has  recently
proven to be a powerful tool for understanding
perception not only in terms of modelling beha-
viour, but also as a theoretical framework for
understanding  how  perception  arises  in  the
brain. A prominent implementation of the latter
is Predictive Coding (Friston 2010). This theory
postulates that the brain builds models (priors)
of  the  world  based  on  previous  experience,
which are used to explain the current inputs.
This occurs iteratively  across all  levels in the
cortical  hierarchy  with the goal  of  minimising
predictions  errors,  i.e.,  the  difference  between
what is expected and the incoming sensory in-
put, which are energetically costly. This minim-
ization process can either be achieved by chan-
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ging the way the system samples  its environ-
ment, or by changing its models. Relevant for
this discussion is the idea that perceptual infer-
ence, in the Predictive Coding framework, im-
plies  that  all  levels  in  the hierarchy reach an
agreement,  i.e.,  minimise all  prediction errors,
much like the idea of a unified/integrative mo-
ment as proposed by Victor Lamme and others
(Dehaene 2014;  Edelman &  Tononi 2000;  Mel-
loni &  Singer 2010).  While  Predictive Coding
by itself is currently agnostic as to whether such
unified agreement represents a conscious state,
the  central  tenet  that  integration  across  all
levels is what the system strives for still holds.
This  allows for  the formulation of  interesting,
testable predictions about the Neural Correlates
of Consciousness (NCC). 
In recent years research in my lab has fo-
cused  on  understanding  how  previous  experi-
ence enriches perception, how expectations alter
the  NCC,  and  how  this  can  be  understood
within  the  Predictive  Coding  framework.  The
central idea that motivated these studies was to
test whether or not the NCC are context inde-
pendent, i.e., impervious to the influence of ex-
pectations,  as  many theories  implicitly  postu-
late. To test this hypothesis we presented sub-
jects with illusory letters, that is letters whose
borders where not explicitly defined but instead
required the activation of figure–ground segreg-
ation cues. We reasoned that providing subjects
with a prior, i.e., knowing which letter would be
presented  next,  would  facilitate  the  figure–
ground segregation process, making an initially
invisible letter clearly visible. In line with our
expectations, we observed that the threshold of
conscious  perception  is  not  fixed  but  instead
changes depending on the availability of previ-
ous knowledge: subjects are able to perceive a
stimulus  on  the  basis  of  minimal  sensory  in-
formation when they have a clear expectation.
We were able to confirm this result in a series of
different paradigms in which expectations could
be generated online from recent experience as in
the example of the letter given above (Melloni
et al. 2011; Schwiedrzik et al. 2014), drawn from
memory based on prior exposure to clearly vis-
ible natural images (Aru et al. 2012), stem from
a life-long history of association between letters
and colour as in grapheme-colour synaesthesia
(van Leeuwen et al. 2013), or result from sys-
tematic  training  as  in  perceptual  learning
(Schwiedrzik et al. 2009,  2011).  These studies
allowed us to test not only whether the behavi-
oural threshold of conscious perception is fixed,
but also how previous knowledge would affect
the neural “construction” of conscious percepts. 
A  first  hypothesis  we  derived  from  the
Predictive Coding framework was that the pres-
ence of strong priors should have an effect of
how quickly content reaches awareness. If con-
scious perception is the result of a process that
iterates until information is consistent between
the different levels of the hierarchy (Di Lollo et
al. 2000),  i.e.,  until  all  prediction  errors  are
minimised, then having a better model of the
input based on prior knowledge may speed up
this process. Indeed and contrary to the com-
Melloni, L. (2015). Consciousness as Inference in Time - A Commentary on Victor Lamme.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 22(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570566 5 | 13
Figure 1: Can you recognize what this is? If not, rotate
the image. Note that once you turn it back around the
object is now clear.
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mon belief  that  information processing in  the
brain has a fixed latency, we observed that the
NCC shifts in time when a prior is  available.
While  the  electrophysiological  difference
between  seen  and  unseen  letters  occurred
around 300ms when it exclusively depended on
sensory evidence, it occurred as early as 200ms
when priors were available (Melloni et al. 2011).
Thus, priors sped up information processing by
100ms.  These  results  have  important  implica-
tions for the search for the NCC as they show
that conscious processing is not bound to a par-
ticular time, but can flexibly adjust its timing
depending on the task at hand, the readiness of
the  system,  or  the  presence  of  expectations.
They also pose a challenge to theories that pos-
tulate that the NCC always occur late, as pro-
posed  by  Victor Lamme (this collection)  or
Stanislas Dehaene (2014).
A second prediction that follows from the
principle of minimising prediction errors is that
in the presence of priors, activity in lower areas
can  be  “explained  away”  by  priors  in  higher
brain  areas  (Murray et  al. 2004);  this  entails
that when inputs can be fully predicted based
on previous experience, they do not elicit pre-
diction errors. To test this hypothesis, we took
the  same  study  to  the  MEG and  performed
source localisation. Here, we found that priors
sparsify the networks involved in processing the
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Figure 2: (a) Original images are filtered through a series of gabor wavelets, which allows the estimation of the points
of maximal local information (Points of Maximal Information, POI) in the source image. (b) Dots of an elastic lattice
are created by mapping the POI in the projection plane, and attracting them by the projection F0 of a gravitational
force G. (c) Pattern of saccades/fixations when subjects recognise a stimulus and its underlying POI map. (d) Pattern
of fixations for stimuli of different degradation levels from high degradation (0) to low degradation (0.30). Dots in blue
correspond to fixations when subjects do not have an expectation of the stimuli, dots in red correspond to patterns of
fixation observed in the presence of expectations. Note that in the presence of expectations, the distribution of fixations
are much less scattered. From Moca et al. (2011).
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stimulus, such that when a prior is present only
the brain areas that are most diagnostic to the
stimulus features are activated (Mayer et al. in
preparation).  All  alternative  interpretations  of
the stimulus are thus “explained away”. Thus,
consciousness  and its  neural  correlates  appear
as mobile  targets,  which adjust their  locus in
the presence of expectations. This poses a fur-
ther challenge to the search for the NCC, as not
only the timing, but also the location of neural
activation does not appear as a diagnostic fea-
ture for the NCC. 
Finally,  Predictive  Coding  also  suggests
that priors may be used to change the way in-
formation  is  sampled,  as  the  models  derived
from previous experience can be used to optim-
ise the search for the most relevant information
(Friston et al. 2012).  Only rarely do we keep
our gaze still and wait for the world to bring
novel  information;  instead,  we  scan  images
through  rhythmic  patterns  of  eye  movements
accompanied  by  fixations.  This  active  sensing
view implies  that  perception  is  not  a  passive
phenomenon in which the system waits for in-
formation to hit the sensory transducers, but in-
stead an active process that seeks information
through  exploratory  routines  (Melloni et  al.
2009;  Schroeder et al. 2010).  To test  whether
and how priors affect the sampling of informa-
tion we developed stimuli  for  which we could
quantify the local information content at each
point (Figure  2) and determined the efficiency
of  information  extraction based  on eye  move-
ments  in  the  presence  or  absence  of  expecta-
tions. Figure  2 shows that when subjects have
prior knowledge of the object they are trying to
perceive, they can immediately orient their eyes
to areas of most diagnostic information for the
perception of an object. At the same time, the
sampling of information becomes sparser, con-
centrating eye movements to maximally inform-
ative areas (Moca et al. 2011). This implies that
priors  direct  our  exploratory  motor  routines,
thus optimising perception.
Overall, these studies show that previous
experience  enriches  the  contents  of  conscious-
ness  and  fundamentally  changes  the  way  in-
formation is processed in our brain, enhancing
speed and efficiency.  This  raises  questions for
theories that propose a fixed latency or neural
locus for conscious access, but also complicates
the quest for the NCC, as they turn out to dif-
fer in time and location depending on the preci-
sion  and  accuracy  of  expectations.  Although
current  formulations  of  Predictive  Coding  do
not make specific predictions about conscious-
ness, this framework may nevertheless prove to
be an important starting point in trying to un-
derstand  these  effects.  In  fact,  more  explicit
theoretical links between Predictive Coding and
consciousness are now being worked out (e.g.,
Clark 2013;  Hohwy 2013;  Seth et  al. 2011)—
after all, Predictive Coding has been framed as
a unifying theory of the brain (Friston 2010),
which would fall short if consciousness was left
unexplained.
3 The neglected dimension of 
consciousness: Time and the flow of 
consciousness
But is that all? One dimension of our experi-
ence that is often neglected is time. Of course,
time is an implicit component of previous ex-
perience, however, it may also be revealing to
consider time by itself. In fact, living organisms
seldom  encounter  a  static  image  in  isolation,
but are instead confronted with a flow of tem-
porally-correlated  sensory  inputs  (Schwartz et
al. 2007). Imagine for instance a tennis match,
and picture the tennis ball flying over the field.
If queried, you could easily estimate where the
ball is, but also where it was a second ago and
where it will be in a few milliseconds. Event-ob-
jects of the conscious mind2 thus per definition
unfold in time and we also act in time: we make
use of current and previous input to figure out
the most appropriate response predicting their
consequences. There is thus a continuum of in-
terdependencies  along  the  time  dimension
whereby every past moment is  integrated with
the present and projected into the future, giving
rise to the flow of consciousness. The same way
2 We are usually conscious of objects, and become so by virtue of their
being differentiated from the background, but also because their in-
ternal features are linked or bound in some way. Objects and their
internal features do not need to be static entities but can have tem-
poral dynamics, i.e.,  they develop or change in time. In this case,
they become events (and thus event-objects of the conscious mind).
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we have been thinking about the integration of
multiple  source  of  information within a  given
moment of time, such as multiple features of a
single  object,  there  is  thus  integration  across
time. A case in point is strikingly vivid percep-
tual aftereffects, such as the waterfall illusion,
where viewing motion in one direction for sev-
eral  seconds  causes  a  subsequently  presented
static image to move in the opposite direction
(Purkinje 1820). Such effects are not limited to
basic perceptual features such as motion direc-
tion, colour, or orientation, but also affect high-
level percepts such as the perceived gender of
faces (Webster et al. 2004), numerosity (Burr &
Ross 2008),  or  gaze  direction  (Jenkins et  al.
2006); and they are not limited to fleeting illu-
sions  that  vanish  almost  instantaneously,  but
may persist  for days or even weeks (Jones &
Holding 1975). This indicates that our current
experience is embedded into a continuous flow
of previous experience at multiple time scales,
ranging from lifelong experience with our envir-
onment  to  short-term,  moment-by-moment  ef-
fects that arise from our most recent encoun-
ters, even if just milliseconds ago.
The past thus leaves traces  (predictions)
that  determine  the  current  contents  of  con-
sciousness.  This  has the consequence that the
contents of consciousness represent an aggregate
of imprints from the past and the present mo-
ment that jointly promote a sense of  stability
over time. However, through which mechanism
these interdependencies affect our perception is
currently unclear. Experimentally, the multiple
time-scales of  previous experience are particu-
larly evident when subjects are confronted with
sequences  of  multistable  stimuli  such  as  the
Necker cube.3 Because the sensory information
these stimuli  provide  by themselves  is  insuffi-
cient to determine perception, they are particu-
larly susceptible to the effects of previous exper-
ience. Under these conditions, one can observe
two different effects that temporal dependencies
entail:  on  the  one  hand,  an  attractive effect,
which increases the likelihood of continuing to
perceive the same stimulus,  and on the other
hand a repulsive effect, which increases the like-
3 But they are by no means limited to ambiguous stimuli (Fischer &
Whitney 2014; Treisman 1984). 
lihood  of  perceiving  something  different.  The
former is often referred to as hysteresis, prim-
ing, stabilisation, or perceptual memory, while
the latter is commonly known as perceptual ad-
aptation. 
Recently,  Chopin &  Mamassian (2012)
studied the temporal  dynamics of  these serial
dependencies, addressing the question of which
part  of  the  perceptual  history  the  system re-
tains  and how remote  and  recent  experiences
differentially  determine  perception.  They  ob-
served a remarkable dissociation between long
stretches of  time that occurred in the remote
past (in their case several minutes) and short
stretches of time that had just recently occurred
(a  few  seconds  ago):  while  the  former  had  a
positive  correlation  with  perception,  and thus
ensured stability over time (hysteresis), the lat-
ter  had  a  negative  correlation  to  perception,
that is, it promoted alternative interpretations
(adaptation). These two timescales indicate that
previous experience can act along at least two
separate timescales and hence, that there may
be  several  mechanisms  at  work.  Using  func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, we set out
to further elucidate how these effects are imple-
mented in the brain, how the brain entertains
these two opposing processes without mutual in-
terference, and what determines their direction
(Schwiedrzik et al. 2014). Presenting multistable
visual  stimuli  sequentially,  we  found  that  al-
though  affecting  our  perception  concurrently,
hysteresis and adaptation map into distinct cor-
tical networks: a widespread network of higher-
order  visual  and  fronto-parietal  areas  was  in-
volved in hysteresis, while adaptation was con-
fined to early visual areas (areas V2/V3). Im-
portantly, hysteresis and adaptation bear a dif-
ferential relation with whether or not the stim-
uli were consciously perceived: while adaptation
was present even if the adapting interpretation
was  not  consciously  perceived  (in  agreement
with previous reports, e.g.,  Hock et al. 1996),
hysteresis  depended  on  what  was  previously
consciously perceived. Hence, conscious experi-
ences  in  the past  affected  the present  experi-
ence,  preserving  continuity  in  time,  while  un-
conscious  processing  had  the  opposite  effect,
bringing change and novelty to perception. 
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This  brings  us  back  to  the  question  of
neural integration, indicating that even in the
case of  integration over time,  the spatial scale
at which neuronal processing occurs determines
whether content enters awareness or not: in the
case of hysteresis, a conscious moment is integ-
rated in time with another conscious moment,
which  involves  a  widespread  cortical  network,
while in the case of adaptation, prior informa-
tion is only integrated within a local module,
which happens irrespective of whether this prior
information is  consciously  experienced or  not,
similar to Lamme’s “base grouping”. This inter-
pretation fits with results that have been ob-
tained in the auditory domain in which short
temporal  regularities  can  be  detected  uncon-
sciously  eliciting  a  locally  generated  event-re-
lated potential (ERP), termed mismatch negat-
ivity (MMN), while detection of long-term regu-
larities depends on conscious perception, which
elicits an electrophysiological response known as
P300 from a widespread network of brain areas
(Bekinschtein et al. 2009; Faugeras et al. 2011). 
Together,  I  propose  that  these  results
mesh well with the idea that one of the func-
tions of consciousness is to interpret the world
in  long  timescales,  bringing  together  the  now
with the past beyond the simple and automatic
input-output  relations  rooted  in  unconscious
processors,  thus allowing for the extraction of
more complex and abstract regularities.  Brain
areas  with  longer  time  constants  such  as  the
prefrontal  cortex  (Fuster 1973)  would  extract
the world’s statistics from the remote past, cre-
ating a model of the world that keeps a stable
picture.  In  contrast,  early  sensory  areas  with
short time constants act on shorter timescales,
sampling  the  world  for  alternative  interpreta-
tions, thus allowing the system to stay tuned to
deviations  from the  long-term statistics  (Clif-
ford 2012; Snyder et al. under review).4
While previous studies and established ex-
perimental  paradigms have  mostly  focused  on
the  “nowness”  of  conscious  perception,  it  ap-
4 Similarly, higher areas have larger receptive fields than lower areas, al-
lowing  integration  over  larger  regions  of  space,  and  are  often  more
broadly tuned (i.e., allow for more variability in the stimulus, e.g., differ-
ent views of the same object). This resonates well with psychophysical
evidence that hysteresis is spatially less specific and more broadly tuned
than adaptation (Gepshtein & Kubovy 2005; Knapen et al. 2009). 
pears that much remains to be learned about
consciousness and its fundamental phenomeno-
logical characteristics such as its flow and our
sense of stability over time. In fact, considering
that much of what we currently know about the
NCC stems  from  “static”  paradigms,  and  by
those I mean paradigms that do not take the
temporal context in which the stimuli unravel
into  account  and  thus  only  inform  us  about
what has “changed” in consciousness, we in fact
only have access to the neural processes related
to the update of contents in consciousness, while
the mechanisms at play in the  maintenance or
continuity  of  our  experience  remain  obscure
(but see Kleinschmidt et al. 2002). The present
might be known, but the flow is still a mystery!
Thus I propose that a full account of con-
sciousness requires a reappraisal of our object of
study  in  which  we  incorporate  the  temporal
flow  of  consciousness  as  another  fundamental
property that needs to be explained. This calls
for a dynamic view in which a train of conscious
states (the flow) would be captured as succes-
sions of neuronal meta-assemblies, each with a
particular  relaxation  time,  followed  by  phase
transitions, which determine the time of emer-
gence,  dominance,  and  dissolution  of  a  state
that leads to another perceptual cycle (Melloni
& Singer 2010; Varela 1999). In this framework,
the rate-limiting factor for the formation of a
new  meta-assembly  would  correspond  to  the
time needed to establish stable phase relations;
while  the  different  time  constants  promoting
stability vs. change may be implemented by dif-
ferent  oscillatory frequency bands,  in  addition
to the intrinsic time window of integration of a
given area (Chaudhuri et al. 2014). 
In  summary,  much  remains  to  be  dis-
covered about consciousness and its neural cor-
relates,  but  significant  progress  has  already
been made since the seminal paper by Crick &
Koch (1990)  that  got  the  field  going  about
twenty-five years  ago. Victor Lamme’s  experi-
mental  work and theoretical  proposals  on the
role  of  feedback  connections  and  reentrant
activity in conscious perception have been cent-
ral to bringing us closer to an understanding of
the neural processes that allow us to “see”. His
paper in this volume contains an erudite review
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of the present knowledge against a background
of thought provoking hypotheses, e.g., that the
function  of  consciousness  is  to  solve  difficult
perceptual  problems.  In  Lamme’s  view,  con-
sciousness is there to create, while unconscious
processes are there to utilise. In close analogy to
any creative process, consciousness in Lamme’s
framework is slow and takes time and resources
to develop. In a way, his proposal is that it is all
about distance, or time. This is a powerful intu-
ition, and an idea worth exploring, yet its con-
tribution does not end there—more than that,
it serves as a reminder of a central character-
istic of consciousness that is  not yet fully ex-
plored,  namely  that  conscious  experience  un-
folds at a  characteristic  spatio-temporal  scale,
and  that  it  is  this  flow  in  space/time  that
brings the strong sense of experiential stability
and continuity. The interwoven temporal scales
of  the flow of  consciousness  that  bring about
the “unity of experience” remain the next chal-
lenge, and maybe the one that will finally un-
lock the mystery of consciousness. 
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